regarded as providing liquidity to the market in a "nonstandard way" (Chailloux, Gray and McCaughrin, 2008, p. 5) . A question is then to know whether central banks have adopted novel and exceptional procedures with regard to LLR practices.
For this purpose, we compare emergency measures taken by central banks in [2007] [2008] [2009] with those applied during financial crises throughout the classical specie regime . The classical period constitutes a reference for at least three reasons.
Firstly, Thornton (1802) , Tooke (1848) and Bagehot (1873) devised the "classical" theory of lender of last resort and studied the innovative actions of the Bank of England.
1 Secondly, the financial environment presented similarities with the contemporary one insofar as markets for securities were, for the most part, developed and even globalized with a very low rate of inflation. 2 Moreover, large amounts of commercial paper circulated among nonbank financial institutions such as bill brokers and discount houses. Bagehot (1873, p. 196) described how "in Lombard Street, the principal depositors of the bill brokers are the bankers […] . Such deposits are, in fact, a portion of the reserve of these bankers; they make an essential part of the sums which they have provided and laid by against a panic". Similarly, unregulated financial institutions such as hedge funds, market mutual funds or investment banks play a major role nowadays in the financial system as well as in the crisis propagation process. In the present paper, all the features of the classical as well as the current periods (financial globalization, low rate of inflation, high development of financial markets and prevalence of unregulated banking) will be referred to as a finance economy. Thirdly, the banking crises and the central bank interventions during the classical period were sometimes as impressive as was the case during the current period, from the crash of 1987 until the collapse of 2008-2009. 3 By contrast, from the Interwar in United States and the Second World War in Western Europe to the 1980s, even if financial 3 liberalization began in the late 1960s in the United States, the banking system can be considered as highly regulated and financial disorders and lending of last resort were not so frequent and significant. In their study of the severe banking crises, Rogoff (2009a, 2009b) show that most of them have taken place since the 1980s in developed countries and since the 1990s in emerging ones. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, p. 205) state that the relative calm from the late 1940s to the early 1970s "may be partly explained by booming world growth but perhaps more so by the repression of the domestic financial markets (in varying degrees) and the heavy-handed use of capital control." With reference to the classical period, we shall mention the Bank of England and the US Clearing Houses. Unlike most European nations, the United States had no official central bank during the nineteenth century. After the severe crisis of 1907, the U.S.
Congress produced a political compromise -the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 -that settled the long-standing conflict between supporters and opponents of central bank (Timberlake, 1993) . Under the National Banking System that prevailed before the issued by commercial banks, controlled and monitored member banks, and issued loan certificates that banking institutions used as interbank means of payment. The loan certificates were considered as a high-powered medium and could be issued in large amounts during periods of liquidity pressures.
1
In order to know whether the recent "nonstandard" central bank interventions constitute a real change, we shall present a comparison, in kind and not in degree, with the classical period. The main difference described in section 2 between the two periods 1 On the US Clearing Houses, see Whitney (1878) , Cannon (1910) , Sprague (1908 ) and Gorton (1985 . The Clearing House system cannot be likened to a complete central bank for at least two reasons.
On the one hand, the participation of banking institutions in regional Clearing Houses was not legally compulsory. On the other hand, the clearing system was not federally unified. The lack of unification in the US banking system was not completely resolved at the beginning of the Federal Reserve System (Wicker, 1996) .
is based on the monetary regime -the specie standard in the classical period and the fiat money regime in the current period -which entails a difference in the central bank rate policy and in the nature of cooperation between central banks. However, both periods may similarly be considered as financial economies, characterized by the extension of securities markets and the active role of nonbank institutions. Thus, beyond the matter of the monetary regime and the bank rate setting, we attempt to discern continuity in the practices of the lender of last resort in a finance economy. In this respect, as it went beyond crisis management or liquidity injection. The fact that central banks have recourse to the centralization of liquidity allocation reveals the severity of the recent crisis, whereas the injection of liquidity appeared to be sufficient to resolve financial crises in the past. Section 8 concludes that, since the financial markets and innovations are highly developed, central banks tend to intervene in a "nonstandard way" and to act simultaneously as lenders and market makers of last resort. We also conclude that the historical roots of financial stabilization by central banks in a finance economy, characterized by large, complex financial markets and unregulated banking, may be found in the classical period and have just been rediscovered.
Interest rate policy and monetary regime
As a first response to financial and banking difficulties in 2007-2009, central when they respectively raised their interest rate to 10% and 8%, and led a "bank war"
across the Channel through telegraph lines (Patterson, 1866; Plessis, 1985) . The wellknown argument of the Bagehot (1873) recommendation for an active use of the discount rate is directly linked to this historical context. It rests on the argument that a "very high" level of interest rate was supposed to generate deflation and thus to restore the balance of trade and import of precious metals.
The monetary regime governs the interest rate policy and also the nature of the international lender of last resort. Under the classical metallic regime, the central banks were constrained by convertibility into specie. International lending cooperation among them could take place through transfers of bullion but remained exceptional during the classical period (Viner, 1937; Flandreau, 1997 However, beyond these differences and irrespective of the monetary regime, other practices of the LLR can be similar in a finance economy.
Liquidity injection and change in asset composition of central bank balance sheets
In 2007 The Bank's intervention in 1825 promptly stopped the panic during the days following the injection of liquidity (King, 1936; Neal, 1998) . The same result occurred with the Bank's intervention in 1847, 1857 and 1866 after the announcement of the suspension of the Act of 1844 by the Government (Newmarch, 1866) . In the late nineteenth century, the Bank's liabilities in the form of bankers' balance gained in significance as a lending instrument during panics and, for instance, they raised by 40% in three months during the 1878 crisis (Collins, 1992 ).
The classical period shows how liquidity injection or even its mere announcement could be sufficient to calm down financial distress whereas central banks appeared
powerless to induce such a catalytic effect during the 2007-2009 crisis. In any case, injections of liquidity are massive and recurrent in a finance economy and, as we shall see, seem to be associated with a widening of the range of counterparts and of eligible collateral.
Unregulated banking and widening the category of counterparts
In their usual open market operations, central banks do not deal directly with all the commercial banks and securities firms but only with a pre-specified category of counterparts that redistribute the liquidity in the banking system. The different components of the monetary operating frameworks (the maturity and frequency of discretionary operations, the counterpart arrangements and the range of eligible collateral, etc.) may differ from country to country (Borio and Nelson, 2008) . For instance, in the European Central Bank system, the range of eligible counterparts is wide and common across operations (open market operations and standing facilities), whereas, in the United States, the counterparts for discretionary operations are significantly fewer than those with access to standing facilities (lending and deposit facilities). Despite the fact that the relaxation of the eligibility of counterparts has been greater in the banking systems that initially had a more restricted framework (in the United States for instance), the central bank interventions during the recent crisis presented similarities with regard to the widening of the counterpart range. Through this short-term credit facility, the Federal Reserve allowed a depository institution to place a bid for an advance at an interest rate resulting from an auction. The TAF concerned all of the 7000 commercial banks (and not only the 20 primary dealers
involved in the open market procedure) and the accepted collateral (that is, any collateral eligible to secure discount window loans) was much broader than with the standard repo. Importantly, the TAF differed from the discount window insofar as it guaranteed the bidders anonymity and thus avoided the stigma problem. Moreover, the Federal Reserve was taking collateral at a price that was almost certainly above what the banks could get for it anywhere else (Cecchetti, 2009 The history of the US Clearing Houses gives an insight into the stigma problem. Clearing Houses had strong incentives to monitor member banks and control them so as to evaluate the quality of their portfolio in accordance with their capital (Cannon, 1910) . The New York Clearing House publicly published information on the balance sheets of member banks as well as on their weekly clearing balances. However, during crises, the New York Clearing House decided to suspend publication of individual bank information in order to protect weaker banks against the stigma of liquidity shortage (Gorton, 1985 Trust companies emerged as financial intermediaries in the late nineteenth century in the United States. They were specialized in collateralized loans, invested in the real estate sector and chose aggressive strategies. In New York City, the assets of the trust companies increased 2.5 times more than the assets of the national banks during the decade preceding the 1907 crisis (Moen and Tallman, 1992) . Under the National Banking System, national banks were federally regulated while trust companies were far less affected by state regulation. In particular, New York trust companies were less constrained by their reserves than New York national banks, which had to meet a legal reserve ratio equal to 25%. Before 1903, the New York Clearing House (NYCH) accepted some trust companies as member banks, but in June 1904, it required a reserve ratio between 10% and 15% so as to establish relative regulatory uniformity within its system. The NYCH was not only worry about its own narrow interests, but more generally with the preservation of banking stability in New York City. However, trust companies that were not Clearing House members refused to apply these new entry requirements, and some member trust companies decided to leave the NYCH in order to maintain their competitive advantages. Actually, the problem was not that the NYCH was too negligent (Wicker, 2000) , or on the contrary, too stringent (Freixas and Parigi, 2008) . The real problem was the free riding behaviour of unregulated financial institutions. They tried to preserve each opportunity for profit that the absence of legal requirement could offer, to the detriment of the financial and banking system as a whole. During the panic of October 1907, the NYCH did not straightforwardly sustain trust companies, but preferred to grant loans to New York national banks, which then gave assistance to trust companies they had close ties with and could get information about. Moen and Tallman (2000, pp. 147, 161) convincingly show that participation at the Clearing House was the key factor for resolving the crisis: "The clearinghouse took action to protect the payments system, but the clearinghouse's method to contain panics relied on timely balance-sheet information of member institutions; information from non-member trusts was perceived as much less reliable.
[…] The New York trusts' isolation from clearinghouse […] was the key element in propagating the massive runs on deposits.
[…] These results indicate that further studies highlighting the extent of clearinghouse or central-bank coverage during crises will be useful in understanding the factors affecting the occurrence and severity of bank runs."
In Britain, eligible counterparts were not as codified during the nineteenth century as today -for instance, several banks and financial institutions did not directly hold a current account in the Bank of England -and they were far numerous than that of institutions with which the Bank had regular relationships. Large amounts were advanced to bill brokers and not only to banks. As an illustration, during the last three months of 1857, the Bank of England advanced more than £9,500,000 to London bill brokers and discount companies, whereas the advances to London and provincial bankers were £7,000,000, and also £14,500,000 to London merchants and traders (PP, 1858, app. 13, p. 405). The Bank of England met with similar difficulties with brokers as the NYCH met with the trust company, and hence announced a new rule in 1858 stipulating that the discount to the bill brokers was "closed altogether" (Neave, PP, 1858, qs.688-695). As Woods (1939, p. 134) has interpreted it, the objective of the rule was to threaten the brokers as far as possible, in order to force them to maintain reserve balances at the Bank.
The broadening of the set counterparts was mostly associated with the enlargement of the collaterals which are eligible for the central bank facilities.
Financial innovation and enlarged eligible collateral
When central banks inject liquidity, they protect themselves against credit risk by their purpose was to lessen strains in wholesale interbank markets and to re-engage the banking sector in the intermediation process. They partly affected the market pricing of these specific assets and entailed a shift in the asset composition of central banks'
balance sheets from liquid and safe assets towards illiquid and risky ones. Such a balance sheet policy was transmitted through two main channels. First, the announcement that the central bank was engaged in operations involving illiquid assets was designed to enhance investor confidence and reduce liquidity premiums (signalling effect). Secondly, the swaps of illiquid private assets for risk-free public sector bonds upgraded the overall risk profile of bank balance sheets and were able to limit banks' reluctance to lend to each other (portfolio balance effect).
Strictly speaking, central banks did not broaden the range of eligible collateral in the early nineteenth century, because they had not a priori defined a narrow set of securities purchased in normal circumstances. quoted by Tooke (1848) and Bagehot (1873) , gave an instructive portrayal of the lender of last resort: "we lend [our assistance] by every possible means, and in modes that we never had adopted before; we took in stock as security; we purchased Exchequer bills;
we made advances on Exchequer bills; we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount"; the governor J. H.
Palmer (PP, 1832, q.164) demand for funding liquidity, with an increase in the net demand for term funding relative to overnight funding, in order to reduce their liquidity mismatch. Some banks purchased assets from or extended credit to the off-balance-sheet vehicles that they had created and the money-market funds that they managed. Lending in difficult circumstances for very short maturities entailed a rollover risk and remained ineffective in periods of panic. To a varying degree all central banks increased the availability of long-term funding supplied to the market through discretionary operations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). In comparison, the lengthening of maturity was not so frequent during the classical specie regime, and central banks often reduced the maturity of the bills they discounted in order to manage the level of their reserves.
Nevertheless, when the Bank of England decided to put an end to the panic in December 1825, the Court agreed to advance at 5% against "long bills -beyond 95 days -which it did not usually discount" (Clapham, 1944, II, pp. 99-100) .
All these central banks' measures to ease the conditions for the provision of reserves by enlarging the range of eligible collateral had been observed right throughout the episodes of finance economy. They created the need for a wider interpretation of the lender of last resort, to include the function of the market maker of last resort.
Insights into the market maker of last resort
In normal circumstances, the usual private market makers intermediate between endusers of the financial system but, unlike general financial intermediaries, they do not act as agents for end-users, but as principals. They provide continuous and effective twoway prices under all market conditions and keep an orderly market by smoothing out price fluctuations. When extended financial markets collapse, private market makers operating in a short-term profit strategy might have neither the incentives nor the capital to carry on their routine function of market stabilization. Furthermore, a financial stability policy confined to granting credit facilities against good collateral is not enough to alleviate the uncertainty regarding the average quality of assets. Central banks that are not constrained by profit maximization may replace the usual market maker by absorbing and removing a significant amount of dubious assets. This is the "market maker of last resort" function. Buiter and Sibert (2007) who coined the phrase suggest that it can be fulfilled in two ways: first, outright purchases and sales of a wide range of private sector securities; second, acceptance of a wide range of private sector securities as collateral for repos and at the discount window. England's intervention in May, some of its shareholders doubted that its duty was to support a segment of the money market by holding private railway company securities, and they wanted to know "whether any of those debentures come from railway companies that had since been able to meet their obligations" (Bank of England, 1866 , p. 1106 . They worried that rumours outside the Bank stated confidently that large amounts of bills had not yet been returned. The Governor answered with reassuring words that the Bank held "no debentures except those of first class railway companies"
(ibid.). The fact that the MMLR concept was not shared or even formulated by central bankers during the classical period should not disguise the fact that central banks were able to hold private securities from markets in difficulty. Similarly, despite the fact that the Bank of England was operating as a supplier of high-powered money during periods of pressure (Collins, 1992) , the responsibility of LLR was far from being unanimously accepted among the directors and a fortiori was not formally announced.
The rediscovery of the MMLR as a part of the LLR function in a finance economy may lead us to foresee certain implications. Firstly, central banks might lose their position of neutrality with respect to private agents. Once they temporarily intervene in the private sector and security markets, and sustain prices of some categories of assets, they might influence the bid-ask spread and relative prices and thus favour some borrowers over others. Secondly, in acting as MMLR, central banks go beyond the strict application of the narrow view that would advise lending against good collateral to illiquid but solvent banks. Once they have been ready to purchase several kinds of private securities (which are not necessarily "good") from banks and also nonbank institutions (on which solvency information is very limited), they suffer from a worsening of the quality of their balance sheet. Finally, the enlargement of the LLR function threatens the smooth exit of the crisis and the financial stabilization policy.
Contrary to the expansion of the central bank's balance sheet arising from liquidity facilities that are self-liquidating, the expansion stemming from risky asset market purchases does not easily reverse itself when the financial system recovers. Risky assets accumulated during the crisis may remain for some time within the central bank's portfolio and may even trigger an erosion of its capital.
The process of centralized allocation of liquidity
In the context of the beginnings of the finance economy in the 1980s, Goodfriend and King (1988) assumed that interbank and financial market participants would be able to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent institutions and that the market as a whole could efficiently allocate liquidity between banks with a surplus and those with a deficit. They claimed that "today's financial markets provide a highly efficient means of allocating credit privately" and found that "it is difficult to make a case for central bank lending and the regulatory and supervision activities that support it" (ibid, p. 15; idem, p. 19) . They concluded that monetary policy would be able to play an important role in In the classical period, central banks could occasionally intervene as crisis managers.
The action of the Bank of England during the Baring collapse in 1890 is commonly mentioned. But as seen in the third section, the Bank acted most of the time as a LLR by issuing high-powered money during panics. In the United States, the evolution of the way the Clearing Houses functioned is instructive. At its beginnings, during the 1860, 1861 and 1873 crises, the NYCH acted as a crisis manager and had to organize the equalization of reserves through the transfer of reserves from banks with a surplus to those with a deficit. Evidence clearly shows that the equalization of reserves took place at the discretion of associated banks (Sprague, 1910, p. 94 
Conclusion
Beyond the monetary regime, which determines differences regarding central bank rate policy and the international lending in last resort framework, we have discerned similarities in the action of the central bank as lender in last resort, between the classical period and the current one, both characterised by the development of financial markets and unregulated banking. Central banks similarly issue large important amounts of high-powered money, adjust the level of information on weak banks during a crisis, can be however disturbed by the lack of information on unregulated institutions, and finally, enlarge the category of counterparts as well as the spectrum of collateral. All of these features lead central banks to act not only as a lender but also as a market maker of last resort. This implies that the more the central bank reinforces their involvement by purchasing dubious private sector assets, the more difficult the crisis exit policy becomes. Finally, during the recent crisis, central banks have had to go further than they did during the classical era, by absorbing excess liquidity in addition to the liquidity provision. Such a centralization of liquidity allocation seems to have been neither observed historically, nor anticipated by theory.
After the Great Depression and the Second World War, the banking system as a whole was regulated, financial markets were far less developed, and banking crises were less frequent and significant. The historical experience of a wider involvement of the central banks was forgotten and even useless. Economists as well as central bankers then shared a narrow view of the LLR in mind. Nowadays, central banks are placed in a finance economy in which financial markets and innovations are highly developed.
They have no choice but to go beyond the narrow conception of the LLR and adapt their tools in consequence, for instance, through the enlargement of the category of counterparts and that of the spectrum of eligible collateral and through the outright purchase of a large set of assets. A line of interpretation would see such procedures as exceptional or as a forerunner to a MMLR paradigm. But the fact is that a wider conception of LLR has simply been rediscovered, just as the historical roots of lending in last resort in a finance economy may be found in the classical period. The main theoretical implication of this rediscovery is that, since the finance economy is significant, the concept of the MMLR should be integrated into the concept of LLR.
More than fifty years ago, Minsky (1957, pp. 185-6) 
